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 ABSTRACT 
Diderot’s Rule*
by Jonathan Beck 
Like many new products, newly released creative goods such as books, music 
records and movies are sometimes ‘surprise’ hits but often flops. Experimental 
and empirical research suggests that it is hard to predict the demand for a new 
creative good, and therefore its success, even for industry experts. Rules of 
thumb on the quantitative properties of demand uncertainty exist for various 
creative industries – including a rule by Denis Diderot (1763) according to which 
one out of ten published books is a commercial success. Yet, representative 
evidence on any industry’s new-product success rate is scarce. This paper 
studies new-product success in a random sample of novels. Its empirical 
strategy to identify success – a simple characterization of author-publisher 
bargaining combined with a parsimonious model of new-product diffusion – is 
based on the common observation that word-of-mouth is a crucial success 
factor in creative industries. Parametric and semi-parametric estimation results 
corroborate Diderot’s rule: between 10 and 15% of novels enjoy significantly 
positive effects of word-of-mouth. 
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Diderot’s Daumenregel 
Neu veröffentlichte Kreativgüter wie Bücher, Musikalben und Filme sind, ähnlich 
anderen neuen Produkten, zwar manchmal "Überraschungserfolge", meistens 
jedoch Flops. Laut experimentellem und empirischem Forschungsstand ist es 
selbst für Branchenexperten schwierig, die Nachfrage nach einem neuen 
Kreativgut, und damit seinen kommerziellen Erfolg, vorherzusagen. 
Daumenregeln zu den quantitativen Eigenschaften dieser 
Nachfrageunsicherheit existieren in einigen kreativen Branchen -- unter 
anderem eine Regel von Denis Diderot (1763), wonach eines von zehn 
veröffentlichten Büchern ein kommerzieller Erfolg ist. Allerdings mangelt es an 
repräsentativer Evidenz zu der Erfolgsrate neuer Produkte, gleich in welcher 
Branche. Dieses Papier untersucht den Erfolg neuer Produkte in einer 
zufälligen Stichprobe von Romanen. Die verwendete empirische Strategie zur 
Identifikation von Erfolg -- eine einfache Charakterisierung der Verhandlungen 
zwischen Autor und Verlag, kombiniert mit einem überschaubaren Modell der 
Diffusion neuer Produkte -- basiert auf der verbreiteten Beobachtung, dass 
Mundpropaganda ein entscheidender Erfolgsfaktor in kreativen Branchen ist. 
Parametrische und semiparametrische Schätzergebnisse bestätigen Diderot's 
Daumenregel: zwischen 10 und 15% der Romane profitieren von einem 
signifikant positiven Einfluß von Mundpropaganda. 
iv 
“Those who say there are no absolutes in the
gamble that is book publishing are almost right.
Actually, there is one. Ultimately the success of a novel
depends on that mystical force called word-of-mouth.”
(Arnold, 2002)
1 Demand uncertainty and new-product success
A salient characteristic of markets for creative goods like theatrical movies, music records
or novels is that demand – and therefore success – is extremely difficult to foresee. Ac-
cording to screenwriter William Goldman (1983), not even industry experts are able to
predict a particular movie’s box office performance. As a result, box office ‘flops’ are an
empirical regularity: De Vany and Walls (2004) find that only 6.3% of all movies earn 80%
of all movie industry profits. Similarly, the market for music records is said to be dom-
inated by a “stiff ratio” – the share of loss-making recordings – of around 90% (Caves,
2000, p. 79; Denisoff and Schurk, 1986, p. 4).
The probably oldest quantification of demand uncertainty in a creative industry has
been proposed by Denis Diderot in a 1763 article.1 He estimates that at most one out of
ten published books is a success while four recover costs in the long run and five end up
with losses:2 “Ajoutez que, de compte fait, sur dix entreprises, il y en a une, et c’est beaucoup,
qui réussit, quatre dont on recouvre ses frais à la longue, et cinq où l’on reste en perte.” Diderot’s
statement is often cited as a rule of thumb in the book trade.3
Caves (2000) claims that this high degree of demand uncertainty – what he calls
‘the nobody knows property’ – is peculiar to creative industries. Success of new industrial
products has been said to follow the more general ‘80-20 rule’ associated with the Pareto
distribution, however, Crawford (1977, p. 51) finds “surprisingly little documentation for
the frequent claim that 80% of all new products fail” and surveys a few studies that report
failure rates between 30 and 90%. Naturally, the management literature focuses more on
the determinants of new product success in an industry than on the success rate itself
1Denis Diderot (1713-1784) was a French philosopher, writer and editor-in-chief of the Encyclopédie, one
of the first encyclopedias.
2The article is published in Diderot’s collected works (Diderot, 1876); the above quote is from a more
recent reprint (Diderot, 2003, p. 61). See Turnovsky (2003) for a review of the general reception of Diderot’s
article.
3For example by Escarpit (1969, p. 123), Tietzel (1995, p. 38) and von Lucius (2005, p. 66).
1
(see Goldenberg, Lehmann and Mazursky, 2001, and the references therein). Moreover,
systematic evidence on the new-product success rate in any industry is scarce for two
reasons: first, it is difficult to obtain a representative sample of products, and second, it
is difficult to measure success.
This paper studies new-product success in a random and hence representative sam-
ple of novels. The release of a new novel as hardcover marks a clear moment of new-
product introduction and ensures comparability of performance across titles. The first
contribution of this paper is thus a quantification of demand uncertainty a creative in-
dustry. As the subject of Diderot’s statement, the book industry is interesting in itself,
but is is also an archetype for any creative industry. Moreover, since demand uncertainty
serves as a building block for many theories that justify the implementation of vertical
restraints, results are relevant to policy makers as well as managers. For example, pro-
ducers of creative goods often allow retailers to return unsold items, but the profitability
of this policy depends on the degree of demand uncertainty (see Cachon and Lariviere,
2005, and the references therein). In the model by Deneckere, Marvel and Peck (1997),
resale price maintenance is always preferred to flexible prices by a monopolistic pro-
ducer, but it can affect consumer surplus and thus social welfare positively or negatively
depending on the extent of demand uncertainty.
The paper’s second contribution is a methodological point concerning the measure-
ment of success in industries in which consumption has a social component. Since cost
data are often unavailable or unreliable, standard measures of new-product success rely
on absolute sales or bestseller status of a product.4 As I show below in more detail,
this approach misrepresents the perspective of producers, because potent suppliers (ie.
‘star’ actors or authors) often demand a large share of the revenues that can be expected
from the presence of predetermined success factors such as the star herself. For exam-
ple, Elberse (2007) finds that the involvement of star actors increases expected revenue
of producers (film studios), however, it does not increase their company valuation (ex-
pected profits).5 In other words, the fraction of new products that were profitable to
4See Elberse, Eliashberg and Leenders (2006) for a review of the multidisciplinary literature that looks at
the effect of academy awards, movie ratings, critic reviews or star participation on movie success.
5A stream of literature initiated by Rosen (1981) discusses whether extreme superstar earnings can be at-
tributed to superior talent. Giles (2006) and the references therein provide empirical evidence on superstars.
Giles (2006) also notes some of the issues in measuring success.
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the producer does not equal the fraction of its new products whose sales exceeded some
threshold.
Therefore, the empirical strategy to identify new-product success in this paper does
not rely on total sales, but uses the common observation that word-of-mouth is a crucial
success factor: “when a new creative good appears, social contacts transmit consumers’
appraisals at a very low perceived cost to them, giving ‘word-of-mouth’ its importance
for a creative good’s ultimate success.” (Caves, 2000, p. 173.). In the context of this paper,
‘word-of-mouth’ is a catch-all phrase for the diffusion of consumer awareness for a prod-
uct and information about its quality. This includes person-to-person communication,
but also (online) product reviews (Dellarocas, 2003) and less direct forms of communica-
tion such as blogs, bestseller lists and Oprah’s Book Club.6
Evidence from a recent experiment by Salganik, Dodds and Watts (2006) shows that
new-product success is basically unpredictable when consumption is subject to word-
of-mouth (or what the authors call “social influence”). Participants in their study were
offered to sample and then download previously unknown music. In some experiment
groups, participants also received information about the number of a title’s downloads
by other participants. In a significant number of cases, titles that were sampled but rarely
downloaded in a group where participants did not receive this information became ‘best-
sellers’ in groups where participants did receive it; and vice versa. Salganik, Dodds and
Watts (2006) conclude that “experts fail to predict successes not because they are incom-
petent [...] but because when individual decisions are subject to social influence, markets
do not simply aggregate pre-existing individual preferences.”
In what follows, I first consider a parsimonious model of new-product diffusion and
word-of-mouth in the context of supplier-producer (author-publisher) contracting (sec-
tion 2). In particular, I show that, if cost data are not available, measures of word-of-
mouth approximate producer success better than nominal sales because the correspond-
ing effects are hard to appropriate by suppliers in ex ante bargaining. The model directly
leads to a parametric approach to identify the occurrence and effect of word-of-mouth in
week-to-week variation in unit sales.7 However, it also illustrates identification problems
6Chevalier and Mayzlin (2006) find that consumer reviews at Amazon.com significantly affect sales –
measured by sales rank – relative to Barnesandnoble.com. Sorensen and Rasmussen (2004) study weekly
scanner data on book sales to find that even a negative review in the New York Times increases the sales of
the reviewed title, but not by as much as a positive one.
7Moul (2007), who quantifies the average effect of word-of-mouth in motion picture revenues, uses a
similar strategy to identify word-of-mouth through intertemporal dynamics of weekly unit sales. However,
3
associated with more general models of word-of-mouth; therefore, I propose a semipara-
metric identification method to accommodate theoretical indeterminacies.
In section 3, I then present the data and discuss estimation results for both the para-
metric and the semiparametric approach. Results indicate that between 10 and 15% of
titles enjoy positive word-of-mouth and thus seem to corroborate Diderot’s rule. On av-
erage, titles that are estimated to enjoy positive word-of-mouth perform better in terms
of total sales, however, some of these titles have relatively low sales whereas some of the
sample’s best sellers are not estimated to enjoy positive word-of-mouth. It is therefore
possible that a success measure based on word-of-mouth leads to a different result than
a standard measure based on nominal sales.
2 Identifying word-of-mouth and publisher success
As conceptual framework, I use a parsimonious model of new-product diffusion that fea-
tures two essential ingredients to describe sales-effective word-of-mouth: heterogeneous
buyers and intertemporal dynamics. In contrast, most studies in the extensive theoretical
and empirical literature on new-product diffusion follow Bass (1969) in assuming that
buyers are homogeneous regarding their propensity to buy and differ only in the timing
of their purchase (see Van den Bulte and Joshi, 2007, for a review). Yet, word-of-mouth
among homogeneous buyers can only affect the intertemporal dynamics of sales, not
their overall level. To have an effect on overall sales, word-of-mouth needs to take place
between buyers that are heterogeneous in their propensity to buy.
I consider the simplest case of heterogeneity: a two-segment structure, where the
population of M potential buyers of a newly released creative good (henceforth “title”)
consists of two types: Nb buffs and Nc casuals (title subscripts omitted). I thus closely fol-
low Caves’ (2000, p. 173) observation that the “distribution of consumers between ‘buffs’
and ‘casuals’ strongly influences the organization of an art realm”. Buffs buy the title in
any case. Casuals only buy if they are exposed to positive word-of-mouth. If there is no
positive word-of-mouth about a certain title, its long-run sales are restricted to Nb. The
case of negative (sales-destructive) word-of-mouth is discussed in section 2.3.
the specific demand model underlying his analysis (nested logit) is very different from the new-product
diffusion model used here, variants of which are widely applied in the marketing literature.
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Heterogeneity-driven word-of-mouth has implications for the ex ante as well as the
ex post view on title performance. First, it affects ex ante bargaining over contract terms be-
tween supplier (henceforth “author”) and producer (henceforth “publisher”), and conse-
quently title success from the publisher perspective. Second, it implies that ex post studies
of aggregate (product-level) sales have an identification problem: the extent of word-of-
mouth needs to be inferred by decomposing observed sales into unobserved sales to buffs
and casuals. In section 2.2, I therefore consider a specification for intertemporal sales dy-
namics that can be used to parametrically identify the effect of word-of-mouth. In section
2.3, I discuss semiparametric identification in the context of more general models.
2.1 Ex ante bargaining and Diderot’s rule
The standard contract between author and publisher grants the publisher the exclusive
right to market the author’s title. In its typical form, this publishing contract consists of
a royalty scheme through which publisher and author share revenues from sold copies.
Revenue-sharing is a standard contractual response to demand uncertainty: for example,
Dana and Spier (2001) show that, when demand uncertainty realizes only after inven-
tory decisions have been made, revenue sharing is valuable also in manufacturer-retailer
contracts (which are outside the scope of this paper).8
The advance. An additional – and in our context more important – twist in author-
publisher contracts comes in the form of a nonrefundable advance payment. The advance
is often interpreted as a device to increase the publisher’s ex post incentives to market
a title, which relates to one of the problems associated with the infeasibility of profit-
sharing (Caves, 2003), but the advance may serve other means as well. Hansmann and
Kraakman (1992) consider the context of an early contracting stage, before the author has
written the book, and study a ‘hands-tying’ contract where the advance helps publishers
to commit to producing the title without detailed knowledge of its contents. Here, I
abstract from this stage and interpret the advance generally as the lump-sum fee in a
two-part tariff that is contracted upon under common knowledge of some forecast for a
title’s sales.
8Horvitz (1966) and a subsequent literature on economic issues in academic (textbook) publishing notes
a number of implications of the royalty scheme for author and publisher marketing incentives. He also
discusses in more detail why the seemingly more natural alternative of profit-sharing is rarely observed in
practice.
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To be more precise, consider the following formal example, denoting by r the au-
thor’s revenue share (0<r≤1) and by A the advance on this share. Assuming fixed pro-
duction costs of C and normalizing the title’s wholesale price to one, the publisher’s
expected gross profits at the time of bargaining are
E[pi] = E[Q]− A− rE[max{0; Q− A/r}]− C, (1)
where E[Q] are expected sales. Since A is nonrefundable, it implicitly defines a thres-
hold value for sales (A/r) below which the author’s factual revenue share exceeds r. For
any value of r, A may be used to appropriate the remaining expected publisher profits,
depending on the author’s bargaining power. Indeed, in practice royalty rates vary lit-
tle across different contracts whereas advance payments tend to vary strongly, even in
relation to the number of copies finally sold (Caves, 2000, pp. 56ff). Book authors are
frequently represented by literary agents who usually earn between 10 and 20% of their
client’s remuneration and who thus have a direct incentive to achieve a high advance. In
fact, agents often attempt to maximize the author’s share of expected profits by auction-
ing publishing rights.9
The combination of royalty and advance implies that publisher profits are not mono-
tone increasing in sales Q, but rather in their relation to expectations E[Q].10 In particular,
this is true for titles whose authors have a strong bargaining position and are thus able
to pocket much of the expected profits – presumably titles with high E[Q]. In the auction
case with sufficiently many competing publishers, A will be close to E[Q]-C, such that
the winning publisher’s profits are close to zero in expected terms and positive ex post
only if sales exceed their expectation.
Forecasting sales. From the publisher perspective, title success therefore depends on
the accuracy of sales predictions, which, in turn, is related to word-of-mouth. Suppose a
title’s potential market has the two-segment buyer structure discussed above. Since buffs
buy the title in any case but casuals buy only if there is positive word-of-mouth, expected
9An auction is the optimal selling format from the author viewpoint (Bulow and Klemperer, 1996) and has
a long tradition in the book industry: see Moldovanu and Tietzel (1998) for an early example and Hansmann
and Kraakman (1992) and De Vany and Walls (2004) for further anecdotal evidence.
10For authors, in contrast, total sales remain important ex post because they are associated with auxiliary
revenues, for example from live performances or movie deals.
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sales consist of
E[Q] = E[Nb] + Pr(word)E[Nc|word], (2)
where Pr(word) is the ex ante probability that a title receives positive word-of-mouth and
E[Nc|word] are expected sales to casuals in that case. The key question is whether it is
possible, at the time of bargaining, to predict title-specific values for all of these compo-
nents. Some predetermined observable characteristics – such as sales of previous titles
by the author or the size of the author’s fan club – are certainly informative regarding
expected sales to buffs (Nb). Author-publisher bargaining is thus likely to operate under
common knowledge of E[Nb]. In contrast, the findings by Salganik, Dodds and Watts
(2006) indicate that predetermined characteristics are unlikely to contain information on
the title-specific propensity to receive word-of-mouth (Pr(word)) and the corresponding
additional sales (E[Nc|word]). In that case, parties can at best work with market-level
statistics or general principles such as Diderot’s rule. For example, suppose the average
probability for the occurrence of word-of-mouth (Pr(word)) is δ and the average value
for the resulting additional sales E[Nc|word] is k times Nb. The maximum advance a pub-
lisher is willing to pay is then A¯ = E[Nb](1+ δk)− C.
It follows immediately that, for titles whose authors have strong bargaining power
(hence A→A¯), publishers end up making profits only in case of word-of-mouth, that is,
only with probability δ. For titles whose authors have weak bargaining power – presum-
ably titles with low E[Nb] – publishers may bargain down the advance payment. For
these titles, however, production costs are relatively more important, which can also lead
to negative ex post profits in case there is no word-of-mouth.11
Empirical implication. In either case, given that contract and cost data are typically
not available or unreliable, differences in ex ante expectations and advance payments
across titles cannot be accounted for empirically. In consequence, observed total sales
are not an appropriate success measure from the publisher perspective. Empirical anal-
ysis may, however, utilize the fact that the more appropriate success measure, the dif-
ference between ex ante expectations and ex post sales, is particularly affected by the ex
post extent of word-of-mouth. An approach to assess Diderot’s rule empirically is thus
to estimate the distribution of positive word-of-mouth across titles. The corresponding
11If the negotiated advance payment is ρA¯, where 0<ρ≤1, publisher profits are negative ex post if there is
no word-of-mouth and C > E[Nb](1− ρ1−ρ δk).
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interpretation of Diderot’s rule holds that δ= 110 : one out of ten titles enjoys positive word-
of-mouth.12 An implementation of this empirical approach requires (i) a representative
sample of titles and (ii) a method to identify the presence of positive word-of-mouth in
sales.
The following model of new-product diffusion illustrates that, with reasonable as-
sumptions on how sales to buffs and eventually casuals distribute over time, it is possible
to not only identify the existence of positive word-of-mouth but also to quantify its effect
on a title’s overall sales (that is, to estimate Nc). In section 2.3, I discuss more general
models and semiparametric identification.
2.2 Intertemporal sales dynamics
As a matter of notation, it is more convenient to consider the total number of potential
buyers of a title M and its share of buffs θ ( NbM ), instead of Nb and Nc. Time-invariant pre-
determined variables that may affect Nb and thus M, such as a title’s characteristics and
price, can be omitted in this section.13 Operating within a continuous-time framework,
denote by Fb(t) the c.d.f. of a title’s sales to buffs, that is, cumulative sales to this group
at time t divided by its population (θM). Similarly, Fc(t) is the c.d.f. of sales to casuals
and fb(t) and fc(t) are the corresponding densities.14
Buffs buy the title in any case, however, not necessarily in its release week. For
example, some may want to first finish the book they are currently reading. A standard
assumption is that in every period the title is bought by a fraction p of those buffs who
have not bought earlier. In continuous terms, this is a constant hazard rate: p = fb(t)1−Fb(t) .
Since Fb(0)=0, we can solve for Fb = 1− exp(−pt) and the cumulative number of sales
to buffs at time t is
nb(t) = θM− θM exp(−pt). (3)
In other words, period sales to buffs – first differences of nb(t) – follow the steady decay
pattern typically observed, for example, for blockbuster movies. In terms of the model,
12An assessment of the part of Diderot’s rule that distinguishes between loss making titles and titles that
just break even, however, is difficult without cost data. Therefore, I focus on identifying successful titles.
13In most European countries, book prices are by law subject to resale price maintenance and thus in-
variant over time. Even in the unregulated U.S. market, intertemporal price variation is virtually inexistent
(Clerides, 2002).
14The following specification was developed independently by Van den Bulte and Joshi (2007) and myself
(Beck, 2007); in the former paper it is a special case of a more general class of models (discussed in more
detail below).
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aggregate sales exhibit steady decay in two cases: On the one hand, the number of casuals
may be zero (θ=1). On the other hand, θ may be below one but there is no word-of-mouth
such that overall sales are limited to Nb and sales dynamics are determined by equation 3.
The upper left title in figure 1 provides an example for sales dynamics without word-of-
mouth. An important implication for empirical work is that in this case, θ and M are not
separately identified. In other words, it is impossible to say how much a title would have
sold if it had received some word-of-mouth. As I discuss below, a related identification
problem is associated with the possibility of negative word-of-mouth.
Casuals. As long as θ<1 the title under consideration has the potential to benefit
from word-of-mouth. In particular, an independent buyer may recommend the product
to w (≥0) casuals each period following her purchase. Parameter w can be interpreted as
a population average; for example, w=.5 means that one out of two buffs recommends
the title to a casual each period after her purchase.15 The contacted casuals then go ahead
and buy the recommended title, unless they have not already done so in response to an
earlier recommendation. Since the probability that a casual exposed to word-of-mouth
at time t has not been contacted and therefore has not bought earlier is 1 − Fc(t), the
cumulative number of sales-effective recommendations at time t is 1− Fc(t) multiplied
by w and nb(t). Divided by the overall number of casuals, (1− θ)M, this amounts to the
density fc(t) and rearranging yields the relationship
fc(t)
1− Fc(t) = qFb(t), (4)
where Fb(t) =
nb(t)
θM and q = w
θ
1−θ is a reparametrization convenient in empirical ap-
plications. Using equation 3 and the fact that Fc(0)=0, this differential equation solves
for
Fc(t) = 1− e
q
p (1−e−pt−pt). (5)
Hence, cumulative sales to casuals are nc(t) = (1− θ)MFc(t), and total cumulative sales
at time t are the sum of nb(t) and nc(t):
N(t) = M(1− θe−pt − (1− θ)e qp (1−e−pt−pt)). (6)
15A simplifying assumption discussed in more detail below is that casuals do not recommend the title to
other people.
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Figure 1: Example sales patterns
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Period sales within the interval (t,t− 1) are then described by N(t)− N(t− 1). Fig-
ure 1 plots the corresponding sales pattern for four different value combinations of pa-
rameters θ and w. Most notably, sales without word-of-mouth follow a convex pattern,
whereas with word-of-mouth they are concave (hump-shaped) in early sales weeks: due
to an increasing number of buff buyers engaging in word-of-mouth, sales to casuals rise
initially. The size and width of the resulting sales hump depends on the intensity of
word-of-mouth and on the relative number of casuals.
2.3 Generalizations
Equation 6 provides a functional form that can be used to structurally identify the extent
of word-of-mouth in title-specific time series of sales. However, the corresponding results
depend on the viability of the model, which can be restrictive in a number of circum-
stances. First, it only considers positive word-of-mouth, although anecdotal evidence
from the movie industry suggests that negative word-of-mouth can also be important.
In terms of the model, negative word-of-mouth would not only imply that w=0, but in
addition that buffs engage in sales-destructive communication among each other. Neg-
10
ative word-of-mouth aggravates the identification problem already present when w=0;
for example, among buff buyers it implies that their overall number (θM) is subject to
decay over time: first-week buff buyers dissuade other buffs from their initially planned
purchase. As evident from equation 3, it is impossible to distinguish this effect from
the hazard rate p. For example, consider the upper left title in figure 1, whose observed
sales decline steadily after release. Based on such data, it is impossible to say whether
the particular pattern is driven by negative word-of-mouth (decreasing θM over time) or
merely by the decay parameter p. Therefore, in order to identify negative word-of-mouth
among buffs, more restrictions on parameter p are needed, for example by assuming it to
be equal across titles.
Second, in the above model casuals care exclusively for recommendations from buffs.
In general, however, positive word-of-mouth within groups may also be sales-effective.
Van den Bulte and Joshi (2007) analyze a more general class of models, which allows for
positive word-of-mouth within both segments, and derive closed-form solutions. These
more general cases have the property that period sales exhibit a ‘dip’ or are convex for
early sales periods, when decreasing sales to buffs are not yet over-compensated by in-
creasing sales due to word-of-mouth. In other words, a hump-shaped sales curve driven
by word-of-mouth can have more than one stationary point and only one of these is the
global maximum. Van den Bulte and Joshi (2007) present evidence on sales of music CDs
that seem to exhibit such a ‘dip’ in early sales weeks. Since models of new-product diffu-
sion are inherently nonlinear, model complexity increases exponentially for these more
general cases. Indeed, estimation based on standard methods can be troublesome, which
complicates comparison between model variants. Nevertheless, all cases share the pro-
perty that word-of-mouth leads to a concave (hump-shaped) pattern around the global
maximum of a title’s sales curve. As I discuss in more detail below, semiparametric iden-
tification of word-of-mouth relies on this property.
Alternative explanations. A related economics literature on the diffusion of new
technologies generally explains a hump-shaped pattern in adoptions, which is inherent
in an S-shaped cumulative adoption curve, by either decreasing costs or increasing ben-
efits of adoption over time (Hall and Khan, 2003). For a new creative good, however,
both price and material product characteristics are usually constant within its short sell-
ing period. Therefore, the only possible kind of increase in benefit is one associated with
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immaterial characteristics: for example, consumers may change their perception of the
intellectual value of a title. This view is generally consistent with the occurrence of pos-
itive word-of-mouth. Similarly, word-of-mouth can be regarded as a variant of explana-
tions based on information diffusion (Jensen, 1988). Other, ‘behavioral’ explanations for
hump-shaped sales often assume some form of suboptimal behavior by producers or re-
tailers, which is outside the scope of this paper. For example, a publisher may gradually
increase marketing efforts for some titles. At least in the book industry, however, tra-
ditional instruments such as advertising seem to have modest effects. Instead, industry
sources emphasize the effects of public performances by a title’s author, which are often
out of direct publisher control.16
2.4 Parametric identification
The standard approach to estimating parametric models of new-product diffusion with
aggregate data is based on period sales, that is, first differences of cumulative sales (Putsis
and Srinivasan, 2000) :
S(t) = N(t; φ)− N(t− 1; φ) + εt, (7)
where S(t) denotes observed sales of a given title during the period (t− 1,t), N(.) is the
cumulative sales function defined by the particular model, φ is the set of model param-
eters and t=1,...,T. Here, N(.) is defined by equation 6 and φ consists of M, θ, p and q.
Assuming that the error term ε has the usual least squares properties, parameters may be
estimated by nonlinear least squares (NLS). A grid search procedure yields proper initial
values for iterative estimation. Through log-transformations, I impose non-negativity for
all parameters, and θ, p≤1.
Neither asymptotic nor small-sample properties of such estimators are known (Bos-
wijk and Franses, 2005), but bias and consistency can be studied by means of a a Monte
Carlo simulation. For the present model, NLS estimates are reliable if observations cover
a sufficiently large part of a title’s life cycle and are not too volatile (Beck, 2007). Fur-
thermore, residual autocorrelation may be present: for example, a television appearance
by a title’s author may boost sales not only in that but also in the following weeks. The
16“Booksellers say author tours, Oprah most effective for marketing books”, Book Publishing Report, vol. 24,
iss. 38; “Suche nach Öffentlichkeit”, Handelsblatt, iss. 54, 16 March 2006.
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procedure to test and account for residual autocorrelation is straightforward (see Beck,
2006b, for more details).
Applied to a title with hump-shaped sales, the model provides estimates for all four
parameters and thus identifies both the existence of word-of-mouth (w) and its relative
sales effect (1 − θ). Based on a representative sample of titles, this approach therefore
yields an estimate of the distribution of positive word-of-mouth in the market – the share
of titles with a positive w – and thus allows for an assessment of Diderot’s rule.
Yet, such a parametric approach is associated with two main problems. First, equa-
tion 3 indicates that the parameters of the model are not identified when sales of a title
are steadily decreasing over time. Effectively, estimates for such titles tend to converge
at boundary values (pˆ or θˆ equal to zero or one, wˆ equal to zero). Results of this kind
may indicate that the respective title did not enjoy positive word-of-mouth and hence
that w=0, but they may also be driven by data volatility (Beck, 2006b). Second, and more
importantly, parametric estimates are meaningful only if the imposed model is a good
approximation of the data generating process. If more general forms of word-of-mouth
cannot be excluded or if data volatility complicates estimation, semiparametric methods
provide useful alternatives to test for the existence of positive word-of-mouth.
2.5 Semiparametric identification
A more general empirical specification for intertemporal sales dynamics is
S(t) = g(t) + εt, (8)
where g(t) denotes the unknown function according to which period sales distribute
over time. Various methods are available to semiparametrically estimate g(t) in order
to obtain a smoothed time series Sˆ(t). In principle, these methods can be viewed as
variants of kernel density estimation that differ mainly in the employed kernel and the
degree of smoothing. Results are typically invariant to the researcher’s choice of kernel
but highly sensitive to the chosen bandwidth (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). Further, a
crucial distinction is between global estimators that search for a function that fits best
over all available data, and local estimators that smooth over a moving data window
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(Ruppert, Wand and Carroll, 2003). Estimators also differ in their treatment of extreme
observations (‘outliers’).
For the purposes of this paper, the locally weighted regression approach (loess, fol-
lowing Cleveland, 1979) seems most appropriate. First, as a local estimator it does not
exhibit irregularities at the beginning or end of the sample that have been found with
global estimators. This is important for the present application because word-of-mouth
driven sales humps tend to occur in early sales weeks. Second, the loess approach has a
high degree of automation, which facilitates application to a large number of titles: only
one smoothing parameter has to be chosen and procedures exist to automate even this
decision; in particular, I will use the improved Akaike information criterion developed
by Hurvich, Simonoff and Tsai (1998). Finally, by iterative reweighting of observations
the loess estimate is robust to extreme observations, which due to events like television
appearances of authors are likely to occur in data of book sales.
3 Empirical results and Diderot’s rule
The data used in this study is a sample of 229 novels randomly drawn from the set of all
novels released 2003 as hardcover in Germany. The data come from a marketing research
firm that aggregates scanner data from over 750 physical points of sale and all main
internet retailers in Germany. In the appendix, I discuss data characteristics and sampling
procedure in more detail.
I focus on novels because this segment is most important for the book trade – both
in economic and cultural terms – and on hardcover editions because only newly released
titles are of interest; in Germany, the paperback edition of a title is delayed, typically
by one to two years.17 As demanded by the data proprietor, I received anonymized data,
where all title-, author- and publisher-specific information except for a title and publisher
code, sales (by week) and price (constant) had been removed. The sample period ends in
summer 2004, providing between 41 and 81 weekly sales observations per title.
17This release strategy is a textbook example of intertemporal price discrimination (Clerides, 2002).
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Figure 2: Distribution of sales across titles
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3.1 Sample characteristics
Figure 2 presents a histogram of total sales observed across titles. It does not account for
the fact that titles are observed for differently long time periods, however, this turns out
to be inessential: most sales take place within the first 26 weeks after release (observed
for all titles).18 The result is a well-known picture: most titles have very low overall sales
– about 43% of titles sell less than 500 copies – and only few titles get to five- or six-digit
sales figures. In effect the distribution of total sales is skewed: whereas the best sellers
drive the sample mean up to 3785 copies, the median title sells 704 copies only. Sorensen
(2007) presents a similar graph based on U.S. data.
Bivariate relationships. The data lack detailed information on title characteristics,
but one might expect a title’s retail price to proxy for characteristics like author reputation
or the number of pages (see Beck, 2006a, for evidence from a comprehensive data set
of prices and title characteristics). Yet, in aggregate terms there does not seem to be a
systematic relationship between a title’s sales and its price: figure 3 relates cumulated
18Figure 6 in the appendix gives standard kernel density estimates for the distribution of cumulated sales:
one including the first 26 sales weeks only and one including all observed weeks for each title. The distribu-
tion for sales including all observed weeks is quite similar and only slightly broader than the one including
the first 26 weeks only.
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Figure 3: No evident relation between sales and price or publisher size
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Note: graph omits one title with 26−week cumulated sales of 91939 copies and a price of 19.
sales after 26 weeks to price by title and gives the correlation coefficient, which is close to
zero. The second panel in figure 3 relates sales to the number of titles a publisher has in
the sample, a measure of firm size constructed from the publisher code. For the median
title the measure is 1, but a number of publishers have multiple titles in the sample. There
seems to be no correlation between this measure of publisher size and title sales.
Another consequence of title anonymity is that it is difficult to determine exact re-
lease dates. Usually, the earliest week with positive sales corresponds to the release week,
but for some titles the raw data seem to contain erroneously booked advance orders;
therefore, I use a systematic procedure to determine the effective release week (see sec-
tion A.1 in the appendix for more detail). In any case, first- and second-week sales fig-
ures are not comparable because in contrast to theatrical movies, new books do not have
a particular weekday for release. One title may be shipped on a Monday and another
on a Friday, leaving only one or two sales days for the latter title’s first calendar week.
Therefore, I omit first-week observations in estimations.
Intertemporal dynamics. The primary information contained in the sample are title-
specific dynamics that underly week-to-week variation in sales. To illustrate both the
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Figure 4: Example titles
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variety of patterns observed in the sample as well as some of the estimation issues, figure
4 presents four example titles. First of all, a significant share of the sampled titles, like
title 1135 in the upper left panel of figure 4, has low overall sales and therefore zero sales
in many weeks. For such a title, neither econometric method will yield useful results
based on week-to-week variation. Altogether, 51 titles (22.2% of the sample) have less
than 13 positive off-December sales observations before they reach 95% of cumulative
sales (which range from 1 to 796 with a mean of 116). I assume that these titles have not
received positive word-of-mouth and I do not attempt to estimate any other parameter
econometrically for these titles.
For a number of titles, hump-shaped sales patterns such as those in the lower two
panels of figure 4 suggest the existence of word-of-mouth effects. For other titles, such
as title 1164 in in the upper right panel, sales variance is relatively high and it is difficult
to infer a particular pattern by mere observation. Therefore, figure 4 already includes
predicted values from parametric and semiparametric estimations. These predictions
turn out similar for titles 1164 (upper right) and 1295 (lower left): the smoothed series
of title 1164 decrease quite constantly over time, while both methods indicate an early
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hump in sales for title 1295. In contrast, sales of title 1179 – which has the highest overall
sales in the sample – remain at low levels initially and are hump-shaped only in later
weeks. Parametric estimation is troublesome in such a case because, in this particular
model of positive word-of-mouth, the sales curve increases right from the start and has at
most one stationary point. Therefore, in cases with multiple stationary points such as title
1179, NLS estimation based on equation 6 exhibits converges problems or converges only
at boundary estimates for p and θ. Locally weighted regression, instead, is more adaptive
to multiple stationary points and can thus identify patterns consistent with more general
models of new-product diffusion.
Christmas sales. Another pattern evident in all four examples is that December
observations tend to depart quite starkly from whatever trend sales follow before and
after December.19 Obviously, this is driven by the fact that books are popular Christmas
presents, an effect that introduces an additional identification problem with December
observations. For the main purpose of this paper, it suffices to merely acknowledge that
the Christmas effect may lead December observations to deviate (positively) from a ti-
tle’s particular sales pattern before and after December; in practical terms, this amounts
to placing zero weight to December observations in estimation. More details on esti-
mation and interpretation of the Christmas effect can be found in section A.2 of the ap-
pendix. There, I also present some regression results which suggest, on the one hand,
that additional Christmas-driven sales do not have significant second-order effects on
post-Christmas sales, and on the other hand, that any potential effect of strategic pre-
Christmas release timing by publishers seems to be of minor importance.
3.2 Estimation results
I apply the parametric and semiparametric estimators to all titles in the sample that have
at least 13 positive sales observations before they reach 95% of observed cumulative sales
(178 titles). Due to the identification problem discussed in section 2.2, parametric estima-
tion based on equation 6 yields degenerate results for a title whose sales pattern is best
represented by a monotone decline or does not converge for a title whose sales pattern
19No other significant seasonal variation seems to be present. In a panel regression specification following
Sorensen (2007), where Siτ = (αi + ατ + βtiτ)Siτ−1 + εiτ , τ denotes calendar weeks and tiτ denotes title i’s
weeks since release at week τ, all off-December week fixed effects ατ are insignificant.
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Table 1: Distribution of parametric estimates∗
Mean Minimum Median Maximum
Directly estimated:
Mi/Ni(T) 1.1 .901 1.08 1.56
pi .103 .0118 .0541 .894
θi .552 .0121 .606 .882
qi .914 .0213 .177 22
Indirectly estimated:
wi .529 .0121 .172 10.3
∗Summary statistics for 59 title-specific NLS results, based
on equation 7 including time dummies for December
observations (see section A.2 in the appendix).
For 12 of these titles, estimates base on an adapted
version of equation 7 that includes AR(1) errors.
requires a more general diffusion model.20 Parametric estimation converges and yields
nondegenerate results for 59 titles in the sample.
The parametric test for the presence of positive word-of-mouth in sales of title i cor-
responds to a test for the significance of coefficient estimate qˆi. Within the set of nonde-
generate results, qˆ is significantly different from zero with 95% confidence for 23 titles.
In other words, the parametrically estimated share of titles that received positive word-
of-mouth is about 10%, a result that corroborates Diderot’s rule. Table 1 summarizes the
corresponding coefficient estimates. To facilitate comparison across titles, Mˆi is summa-
rized relative to observed total sales Ni(T).21 The estimated hazard rate for sales to buffs
(pˆi) is .1 on average, however, this average seems to be driven by some titles with high
estimates. Mean and median estimates for the share of buff buyers are closer to each
other (.55 and .61, respectively) and indicate that buff buyers tend to make up for the
majority of sales also for titles with positive word-of-mouth. Figure 5 provides more de-
tails on the distribution of q- and M-estimates across titles. Most q-estimates are below .5
and whereas the few larger estimates are almost all significant, a good share of the lower
estimates is significant as well. Altogether, across titles that seem to have enjoyed some
word-of-mouth there is no evident relationship between its intensity (as measured by q)
and overall sales (as measured by M).
20I classify converged estimates as degenerate if they fulfill at least one of the following conditions: (i) pˆ is
smaller than .01 and not significantly different from zero, (ii) θˆ is smaller than .01 or larger than .99 and not
significantly different from zero or one (both with 95% confidence).
21Since Mˆi does not include Christmas sales, it can be lower than Ni(T) for titles with a large Christmas
share.
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Figure 5: Significance of word-of-mouth estimates and correlation with overall sales
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The semiparametric test for the existence of word-of-mouth is directly based on the
estimated shape of the sales curve. In particular, it draws on the theoretical result that
positive word-of-mouth leads to a concave sales pattern around a title’s peak sales. The
proper semiparametric test corresponding to a test for q=0 in the parametric case, there-
fore, is a test for convexity of the sales pattern around peak (maximum) sales. In par-
ticular, I reject local convexity if loess-predicted peak sales are significantly greater than
predicted sales in week 2; that is, if the 95% confidence intervals around these two predic-
tions do not overlap. For example, the loess fit for sales of title 1164 in figure 4 is steadily
decreasing. Predicted values and confidence intervals for peak sales and sales in week 2
are thus equivalent and convexity cannot be rejected. For titles 1295 and 1179, this test
rejects convexity and thus indicates the existence of positive word-of-mouth. Altogether,
the semiparametric test rejects convexity for 34 titles and hence suggests that less than
15% of all titles in the sample received positive word-of-mouth, which is also close to
Diderot’s prediction.
Table 2 compares the distribution of total sales across the identified subsamples of
titles with and without indication of word-of-mouth. For both methods of identification,
subsample averages of observed total sales are significantly different (t-test, 99% confi-
dence). Titles with signs of positive word-of-mouth indeed perform better in terms of
total sales, however, some of these titles have relatively low sales whereas some of the
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Table 2: Distribution of total sales across titles with and without word-of-mouth
No. of Observed total sales Price PubSize∗
titles Mean Min. Median Max. Mean Mean
Full sample 229 3785.0 1 704 105416 17.40 3.1
Estimation sample 178 4836.2 87 1250.5 105416 17.71 3.4
Parametric test for convex sales (95% confidence):
not rejected 155 3743.6 87 1022 105416 17.66 3.3
rejected 23 12199.6 354 5911 43200 18.11 3.9
Semiparametric test for (locally) convex sales (95% confidence):
not rejected 144 3561.6 87 1139.5 43200 17.83 3.3
rejected 34 10234.4 218 1983.5 105416 17.21 3.8
∗Number of sampled titles published by the respective publisher.
sample’s best sellers are not estimated to enjoy positive word-of-mouth. The two success
measures nominal sales and word-of-mouth can therefore lead to contrasting findings. In
other words, a success measure based on word of mouth can lead to a different result than
a measure based on sales alone, although the two measures are likely to be correlated.
Table 2 also summarizes retail prices and a measure of publisher size (the number
of sampled titles published by the respective publisher) for each subsample. For both
methods of identification, both average retail prices and publisher size do not differ sig-
nificantly across titles with and without identified positive word-of-mouth (t-test, 95%
confidence). These findings suggest that predetermined title or publisher characteristics
are of little help in predicting the occurrence of word-of-mouth.
4 Concluding remarks
Many new products fail commercially, however, this statement holds to different degrees
in different industries. Creative industries seem to have especially low new-product suc-
cess rates, and professionals in these industries share rules of thumb on the extent of
demand uncertainty. For example, an old rule going back to Denis Diderot (1763) states
that one out of ten published books is a commercial success. Representative evidence on
the new-product success rate, however, is scarce for any industry.
In this paper, I study new-product success in a random sample of novels. My em-
pirical strategy to identify a successful title is based on a parsimonious model of new-
product diffusion and author-publisher bargaining. I show that indicators of word-of-
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mouth measure success better than standard measures of total sales and apply both a
parametric and a semiparametric estimation method to identify the existence and extent
of positive word-of-mouth based on a title’s week-to-week variation in sales. Estimation
results indicate that between 10 and 15% of titles enjoy positive word-of-mouth and thus
corroborate Diderot’s rule.
Measures of positive word-of-mouth are imperfectly correlated with a title’s total
sales and are not correlated with predetermined title characteristics such as a title’s retail
price. Although based on limited data on title characteristics, these findings support the
view that the title-specific extent of word-of-mouth is extremely difficult to foresee and
that choice of measure is important in studying new-product success. Based on more
comprehensive data such as author-, producer- and eventually consumer-specific infor-
mation, future research will be able to better understand how word-of-mouth affects suc-
cess of new products whose consumption has a social element.
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A Appendix
A.1 Data characteristics
The results in this paper are based on a sample of novels released 2003 as hardcover
in Germany. This is a representative sample that I drew myself on location at the data
provider (Media Control GfK International) from the set of all hardcover novels released
in 2003, using a list of computer-generated random numbers. Media Control GfK Interna-
tional aggregates scanner data from over 750 points of sale (bookshops, department) as
well as all main internet retailers in Germany. Not sampled are direct sales from publish-
ers to consumers, book club sales and mail order sales. Supermarket sales are also not
sampled, but they represent a negligible portion of book sales. Altogether the sampled
retail channels account for about 66% of total book sales in Germany.
Yet, for the particular segment studied here (novels in hardcover), sales coverage of
sampled channels is likely to be much higher. First, publisher direct sales are not very
important for popular publications such as novels; direct sales usually concern profes-
sional publications. Second, book clubs can be regarded as a secondary market that only
becomes important for a title after its diffusion in the primary market (which is stud-
ied here). Furthermore, no particular estimation bias arises from this type of sampling.
By law, book prices are the same for all retail channels.22 In theory, buffs may be more
inclined to order directly from publishers because they do not need retailer advice; in
practice, however, title availability is high and ordering processes are quicker (typically
overnight) at stationary bookshops and online retailers. Direct orders from publishers
are thus unattractive for non-professional buyers.
The raw data indicate negative sales – books returned by consumers after purchase
– for 18 weekly observations. A good share of these take place in January and thus seem
to be mis-given Christmas presents. In estimations, I replace sales with value zero in
these observations. In addition, data for some titles appear to contain advance orders
erroneously booked as sales: sales of 1, 2 or 3 copies followed by a number of zero-sales,
long before sales actually take off with two- and three-digit weekly sales.23 I therefore
apply an automatic procedure to identify the most evident cases, namely those in which a
22In many European countries including Germany, book prices are by law subject to resale price mainte-
nance; that is, retailers must not offer discounts from the publisher’s list price.
23In fact, each observation (sales of 1, 2 or 3) may arise from just one pre-ordered copy because some points
of sale from which the data were aggregated have a sample weight larger than one.
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first sales observation of 1, 2 or 3 copies is below the respective title’s average weekly sales
(based on weeks with nonzero sales) and is followed by a zero-sale week. I assume that
such an observation represents an advance order and add the amount to the following
observation of positive sales, which I assume to be the effective release week. Since a few
titles seem to exhibit multiple weeks with such advance orders, I repeat the procedure
four times. In a similar exercise, I also interpret all first-week sales observations of sales
of 1 to 3 copies as advance orders whenever they were below 10% of the title’s average
sales (based on weeks with nonzero sales). Apart from identifying a title’s effective first
sales week, these procedures leave results essentially unaffected because first-week sales
observations are not used in estimations (see section 3.1).
The initial sample consisted of 307 titles, but many of those were actually not sold
before 2004 or very late in 2003. This is not unusual because a title’s release year is deter-
mined with publication of the publisher’s season catalogue, long before the start of the
season. For most titles the production process is not yet finalized at that point. Therefore,
a late start of observed sales is a sign of delayed release rather than weak demand. In
order to ensure a sufficient number of observations per title, I restrict attention to the 229
titles in the sample that began selling before mid-October (week 43 of 2003).
Figure 6: Distribution of cumulated sales across titles
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A.2 The Christmas effect
Christmas-driven purchases are usually concentrated on the December weeks (tD; D=1,...4)
and can boost a title’s sales significantly, which introduces an additional identification
problem. In each of the four December weeks, sales Si(tD) consist of three independent
parts: the ‘usual’ model part f (t), an error term ε itD , and extra Christmas-driven sales
sxi (tD). For the moment, the independence of f (t) and s
x
i (tD) is an assumption, but sup-
portive evidence is presented below.
For parametric identification of f (t), I include time dummies for each December
week, whose coefficients (λD) are assumed to be non-negative. With respect to estima-
tion of model parameters, this amounts to placing zero weight on December observations
only when they are above the title’s specific trend. Predicted values from the original
function to be fitted are then unresponsive to December spikes, and the λ-coefficients
capture all sales in excess of those predicted by the otherwise best-fitting set of param-
eters. Provided E[ε itD ]=0, the sum of these coefficients may then be interpreted as an
estimate for a title’s extra Christmas sales: S˜xi = ∑D s
x
i (tD) = ∑D λˆD.
24 On average, para-
metrically estimated extra Christmas sales S˜xi represent about 10% of the average title’s
overall sales; for some titles, however, S˜xi represents up to one third of overall sales.
If one is interested primarily in estimating f (t), a simple solution to the Christmas
identification problem is to place zero weight on December observations in estimation.
I follow this approach for the semiparametric estimation results presented in this pa-
per. The underlying assumption is again that f (t) and extra Christmas sales (sxi (tD))
are independent. In order to be able to assess the validity of this assumption, I first
use the semiparametric model to obtain a title-specific estimate of extra Christmas sales
(Sˆxi ). Provided E[ε itD ]=0 and given an estimated smooth function f (t) for observed pre-
and post-December sales, I impute December values f (tD) by interpolation. An esti-
mate for extra Christmas sales in December week tD is then the difference Si(tD)− f (tD)
whenever it is positive, or zero else. Yet, period sales are differently variant across titles
(heteroskedastic), which affects this estimate of sxi (tD). As a more robust estimate that
enables comparison across titles with different sales variances, I therefore use the upper
24Alternatively, one may specify a functional form for sxi (tD) and its relation to f (t) and εit (see Beck,
2006b, for a parsimonious approach).
25
limit of the prediction’s confidence interval f C¯I(tD) in calculating extra Christmas sales:
Sˆxi =
4
∑
tD=1
(Si(tD)− f C¯I(tD)) 1(Si(tD) > f C¯I(tD)).
Based on this estimate for Sxi , I assess a potential relationship between a title’s extra
Christmas sales and its post-Christmas performance by running the following cross-title
regression:
N2004i
N2003i − Sˆxi
=
(1.16)
(1.76)
1.46
(−.04)
(−.02)
−.03 T2003 (−.09)
(+.33)
+ .12
Sˆxi
N2003i − Sˆxi
+ ε i,
where i = 1, ..., 176 (R2 = .25).
In this regression, N2004i denotes sold copies observed for title i’s in the first half of 2004,
N2003i denotes sold copies observed for title i’s since its release in 2003, and T
2003 denotes
the number of weeks title i has been sold in 2003 (52 minus its 2003 release week). In
other words, the regression relates a title’s level of observed 2004 sales (relative to 2003
non-Christmas sales) to the number of weeks it has been for sale in 2003 as well as to the
level of extra Christmas sales (relative to 2003 non-Christmas sales). Bracketed numbers
indicate 95% confidence intervals for the estimates (centred).25 The estimated coefficients
indicate, for example for a title released in mid-2003 (hence T2003=26), that on average
2004 sales represent about 68% of 2003 non-Christmas sales. The estimated effect of extra
Christmas performance is modestly positive on average but not significantly different
from zero (an increase in S
x
i
N2003i −Sxi
by .25 – about one standard deviation – is associated
with an increase in relative 2004 sales by about 3%-points on average.). Hence, additional
Christmas-driven December sales do not seem to induce second-order sales effects in the
new year.
A second Christmas-related issue that may affect estimation results is strategic re-
lease timing: do publishers strategically choose release times for titles that are expected to
do well in the Christmas season? A simple approach to this question is to assess whether
a title’s extra Christmas sales are related to its release date (its distance to Christmas).
25Confidence intervals do not account for the fact that Sˆxi is itself the result of an estimation and are
therefore too narrow. Furthermore, the above estimates exclude two titles that due to large sales shocks
in 2004 have very large values of N2004i /N
2003
i . In a regression that includes these two titles, all coefficients
are insignificant.
26
Regressing extra Christmas sales, relative to overall non-Christmas sales (Ni), on release
week (T2003) gives the following result:
Sˆxi
Ni − Sˆxi
=
(.24)
(.40)
.32
(−.009)
(−.004)
-.006 T2003 + ε i,
where i = 1, ..., 178 (R2 = .12).
These estimates indicate that the relationship between release timing and Christmas sales
is indeed modestly positive: moving a title’s release date one week closer to Christmas
is associated with an estimated increase in the relative size of Christmas sales by .006%-
points. Yet, it is unclear whether this effect is a strategic one. A confounding effect is that
older titles are less attractive as Christmas presents because they have a higher probabil-
ity that the donee already knows them. Given the relatively modest economic effect and
the high variability in the data as indicated by a low R2, I conclude that strategic release
timing with respect to Christmas seems to be of minor importance.
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